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ABSTRACT 
In 1983 L. E. Jones exhibited a surprising example of a weakly Pareto optimal al­
location in a two consumer pure exchange economy that failed to be supported by 
prices. In this example the price space is not a vector lattice (Riesz space). Inspired 
by Jones' example, A. Mas-Colell and S. F. Richard proved that this pathological 
phenomenon cannot happen when the price space is a vector lattice. In particu­
lar, they established that (under certain conditions) in a pure exchange economy 
the lattice structure of the price space is sufficient to guarantee the supportability 
of weakly Pareto optimal allocations by prices-i.e., they showed that the second 
welfare theorem holds true in an exchange economy whose price space is a vector 
lattice. In addition, C. D. Aliprantis, D. J. Brown and 0. Burkinshaw have shown 
that when the price space of an exchange economy is a certain vector lattice, the 
Debreu-Scarf core equivalence theorem holds true, i.e., the sets of Walrasian equilib­
ria and Edgeworth equilibria coincide. (An Edgeworth equilibrium is an allocation 
that belongs to the core of every replica economy of the original economy.) In other 
words, the lattice structure of the price space is a sufficient condition for avoiding 
the pathological situation occuring in Jones' example. 
This work shows that the lattice structure of the price space is also a necessary 
condition. That is, "optimum" allocations in an exchange economy are supported 
by prices (if and) only if the price space is a vector lattice. Specifically, the following 
converse-type result of the Debreu-Scarf core equivalence theorem is established: If 
in a pure exchange economy every Edgeworth equilibrium is supported by prices, then 
the price space is neceBSarily a vector lattice. 
WHEN IS THE CORE EQUIVALENCE THEOREM VALID? 
Charalambos D. Aliprantis and Owen Burkinshaw* 
An answer to the question of the title is provided. It is shown that under some conditions the core 
equivalence theorem holds true (if and) only if the price space is a vector lattice. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Many of the current models of economies with infinitely many commodities require 
that the commodity space is a Riesz space and that the commodity-price dual pair is a 
Riesz dual system. Recently, there has been interest in how much these requirements 
can be relaxed. It is our purpose to examine how the basic welfare theorems relate 
to the lattice structure of the commodity and price spaces. We consider economies 
where the commodity space E is a vector lattice with a locally convex topology 
and the price space is the topological dual E' with a generating positive cone. The 
main result of this paper asserts that if the core equivalence theorem holds true for 
such economies, then the price space must be a vector lattice. This shows that the 
lattice structure of the commodity-price duality is essential for the validity of the 
fundamental theorems of welfare economics. 
In this paper, we shall employ the mathematics of Riesz spaces. We shall follow 
the notation and terminology of [5] . Let us briefly mention a few things about Riesz 
spaces. A Riesz space (or a vector lattice) is a partially ordered vector space 
which is also a lattice-in the sense that for each pair of vectors x and y the 
supremum (least upper bound) and the infimum (greatest lower bound) exist; using 
standard lattice terminology we shall write 
x Vy= sup{x,y} and x I\ y = inf{x, y}. 
As usual, the positive cone of a Riesz space E will be denoted by E+, i.e., E+ = 
{x EE: x 2: 0}-the symbol lR will denote the set of real numbers. For an arbitrary
element x of a Riesz space, its positive part, its negative part, and its absolute value 
are defined by the formulas 
x+=xVO, x-=(-x)VO, and lxl=xV(-x) . 
* Research of both authors was supported in part by a Chrysler Corporation grant to IUPUI. 
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A vector subspace F of a Riesz space E is said to be a Riesz subspace
whenever for each x, y E F the supremum x Vy (taken in E) belongs to F. A
(non-empty) subset A of a Riesz space is said to be a solid set whenever Jxl :":'. JyJ 
and y E A imply x E A. A solid vector subspace of a Riesz space is referred to
as an ideal. An ideal is always a Riesz subspace but the converse is not true. A 
linear functional f :---> iR on a Riesz space E is said to be order bounded whenever 
it carries order bounded subsets of E onto bounded subsets of iR; every set of the 
form [x, y] = { z E E: x :":'. z :":'. y} is known as an order interval and subsets of
order intervals are called order bounded sets. Every positive linear functional f ,  
i.e., any linear functional f that satisfies f(x) 2: 0 for each x 2: 0, is necessarily
order bounded. The set of all order bounded linear functionals on a Riesz space is a 
vector space which is also a partially ordered vector space under the ordering f 2: g 
whenever f( x) 2: g( x) for all x E E+. The partially ordered vector space of all
order bounded linear functionals on a Riesz space E is called the order dual of E 
and is denoted by E-. It turns out that the the order dual E' of a Riesz space E 
is also a Riesz space whose lattice operations are given by 
fVg(x)=sup{f(y)+g(z): y, z E E+ and y+z=x} 
and 
f/\g(x)=inf{f(y)+g(z): y, z E E+ and y+z=x} 
for aii f, g E E- and all x E E+. 
Definition 1.1. A Riesz dual system (E, E') is a dual system such that 
1) E is a Riesz space;
2) E' is an ideal of the order dual E- separating the points of E; and
3) the duality function ( · , ·) is the natural one, i.e., 
(x,x') = x'(x) 
holds for all x E E and all x' E E'. 
Most examples of dual systems employed in economics are Riesz dual systems. 
Here are a few examples of Riesz dual systems. 
a) (Lp(µ),Lq(µ)), l<p,q<oo; �+�=1;
b) (Cp,Cq), l:"'.'.p,q:"'.'.oo; �+�=1;
c) (L=(µ),L1(µ)) and (L1(µ),L=(µ)), µ a a-finite measure; and
d) (C(ll), ca(ll)), l1 a Hausdorff compact topological space.
The dual system (ca(ll), C(ll)) is not (in general) a Riesz dual system. A symmet­
ric Riesz dual system is a Riesz dual system (E, E') such that each order interval 
of E is weakly compact (i.e., a(E, E')-compact). The term "symmetric Riesz dual 
system" is justified from the fact that in a Riesz dual system (E, E') the order in­
tervals of E are wealdy compact if and only if E is (under its natural embedding) 
an ideal of (E'r, and so (E',E) is also a Riesz dual system. 
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A locally solid Riesz space (E, r) is a Riesz space E equipped with a locally 
solid topology r (a linear topology r is said to be locally solid whenever it has 
a base at zero consisting of solid neighborhoods). The topological dual E' of a 
locally solid Riesz space ( E, r) is always an ideal of the order dual E', and hence
E' is always a Riesz subspace of the order dual. A locally convex-solid Riesz space 
( E, r) is a Riesz space E equipped with a Hausdorff linear topology r that has 
a base at zero consisting of solid and convex neighborhoods-the topology r is 
referred to as a locally convex-solid topology. It turns out that a linear topology on 
a Riesz space space is locally convex-solid if and only if it is generated by a family of 
lattice seminorms. (A seminorm q on a Riesz space is said to be a lattice seminorm 
whenever lxl :<::: IYI implies q(x) :<::: q(y).) If (E, r) is a locally convex-solid Riesz
space and E' denotes its topological dual, then (E, E') is a Riesz dual system-as a 
matter of fact, every Riesz dual system (E, E') can be obtained in this manner, i.e., 
if (E, E') is a Riesz dual system, then there exists a Hausdorff locally convex-solid 
topology r on E consistent with the duality (E, E') such that E' is the topological 
dual of (E, r). 
For a given Riesz dual system (E, E') there are two distinguishable consistent 
locally convex-solid topologies on E. They are the absolute weak and absolute 
Mackey topologies. The absolute weak topology l<T l(E, E') is the locally convex-solid 
topology on E of uniform convergence on the order intervals of E' and is generated 
by the family of lattice seminorms {qx'' x' EE'} , where
qx'(x) = lx'l(lxl) 
for all x E E and all x' E E'. The absolute Mackey topology lr l(E, E') is the
locally convex-solid topology on E of uniform convergence on the convex, solid, and 
<T( E', E)-compact subsets of E'. We have the following inclusions 
<T(E, E') � l<T l(E, E') � lr l(E, E') � r(E, E') . 
A locally convex-solid topology r on E is consistent with the duality (E, E') if and 
only if l<T l(E, E') � r � lr l(E, E') holds. 
Since the introduction of Riesz spaces (vector lattices) to general equilibrium the­
ory by C. D. Aliprantis and D. J. Brown [1], several authors have utilized the lattice 
structure of Riesz spaces and obtained equilibrium results; see [2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13]. 
Among the major contributions in this quest were the works of A. Mas-Cole!! [8, 9]. 
In [SJ A. Mas-Colell introduced two important notions for an exchange economy; the 
notion of uniform properness for preferences and the closedness condition. We shall 
discuss these two notions below; for a complete discussion and proofs see Chapter 3 
of [4]. 
Definition 1.2. Let � be a preference relation defined on the positive cone C
of a partially ordered topological vector space. Then the preference � is said to be 
uniformly proper whenever there exist.� a. 'neighborhood V of zero a:nd some vector 
v > 0 (called a vector of uniform properness} such that 
x - av + z � x in C with a > 0 implies z tf: a V .
4 
In the above definition, if the vector v and the neighborhood V are needed to 
be emphasized, then we shall say that the preference t is (v, V)-uniformly proper; 
likewise, if the vector v must be emphasized, then we shall simply say that t is v­
uniformly proper. The reader should keep in mind that a preference t is uniformly 
proper if and only if there exists an open convex cone r satisfying 
1) rn (-E+)'f'0; and
2) (x +I') n {y EE+: y t x} = 0 for all x EE+.
For details and more about uniformly proper preferences see [4, Section 3.2]. Now 
let us introduce the economic model that will be the subject of our discussion. 
Definition 1.3. An exchange economy is a pair 
((E, E'), {(t;,w;): i = 1,. . . ,m})
that satisfies the following properties: 
i) The dual pair (E, E') is a Riesz dual system that describes the commodity-price
duality; E is the price space and E' is the price space1. The evaluation (x , p)
will be denoted-as usual-by p 
· 
x, i.e., (x , p) = p
· 
x. (The linear functionals
of E will be referred to in general as prices.)
ii) There are m consumers indexed by i each of whom has E+ as his consumption
set and has an initial endowment w; > 0. The total endowment will be denoted
by w, z.e., m 
w= L Wi. 
i=l 
iii) The taste of each consumer i is represented by a preference relation (i.e., by
a reflexive, complete, and transitive relation) on E+. It is assumed that each
preference relation t; is
a) monotone; i.e., x 2. y in E+ implies x t; y;
b) convex; i.e., the set {y E E+: y t; x} is convex for each x E E+;
c) continuous for some locally convex-solid topology T on E consistent with
the duality (E, E'); and
cl) has w as an extremely desirable bundle, i.e., 
x +aw >--; x 
holds for all x E E+ and all a > 0. 
Recall that an allocation is an m-tuple (x1, ... , Xm) such that x;  EE+ holds
for each i and 2::;':1 x; = w. A non-zero price p is said to support an allocation
(x1, .. .  ,xm) whenever
1 Later, this restriction will be weakened. Specifically, we shall also assume that (E, E') is a 
dual system such that E is a Riesz space and E' is a vector subspace of the order dual E�.
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Supporting prices are necessarily positive prices-and hence , they belong to the order 
dual E�. To see this, let a price p support an allocation (xi, ... , Xm) and let x 2'. 0.
Since ti is monotone, we see that Xi + x ti xi and so p ·(xi + x) 2'. p ·xi from
which it follows that p · x 2'. 0.
An allocation (xi, ... ,xm) is said to be weakly Pareto optimal whenever
there is no other allocation (Yi, ... , Ym) satisfying Yi >-i Xi for each consumer i. 
The first fundamental theorem of welfare economics can be now formulated as follows. 
Theorem 1.4. (The First Welfare Theorem) If an allocation (xi , ... , xm) is sup­
ported by a price p with p · w f 0, then the allocation (Xi, ... , Xm) is weakly Pareto
optimal. 
Proof. Let a price p with p · w f 0 support an allocation (xi, ... ,xm)· Assume
by way of contradiction that the allocation ( x1, ... , xm) is not weakly Pareto opti­
mal. So, there exists another allocation (yi, ... , Ym) satisfying Yi >-i Xi for each i. 
Clearly, p ·Yi 2'. p ·Xi holds for each i and from the identity 2:;':1 Yi = 2:;':1 Xi = w, 
it follows that p · Yi = p · Xi for each i. 
From :Z;':1 Xi = w and p · w f 0, we see that there exists some k with
p · Xk > 0. By the continuity of the preference tk there exists some 0 < E: < 1 such
that E:Yk >-k Xk. Therefore, we have
p · Xk =p · Yk > E:p · Yk =p· (cyk) 2'.p· xk, 
which is impossible. This contradiction shows that the allocation (Xi, . . . , xm) 1s
weakly Pareto optimal. II 
The converse statement of the preceding theorem is known as the Second Welfare 
Theorem. Using the notion of uniform properness A. Mas-Colell [8] established the 
following version of the second welfare theorem. 
Theorem 1.5. (The Second Welfare Theorem) If in an exchange economy prefer­
ences are monotone, convex and uniformly proper, then every weakly Pareto optimal 
allocation can be supported by a non-zero price. 
Moreover, if for each i we pick a convex solid r-neighborhood V; of zero and 
a vector Vi > 0 that satisfy the definition of uniform properness for t;, then every 
weakly Pareto optimal allocation can be supported by a price p > 0 that satisfies 
m 
and IP. zl � 1 for all z E v = n Vi.
i=l 
An allocation (x1, ... , Xm) is said to be a quasiequilibrium whenever there
exists a non-zero price p E E' such that
x t; x; in E+ implies p · x 2'. p · w;. 
It is easy to see that if an allocation (x1, ... , xm) is a quasiequilibrium with respect
to a price p, then p · Xi = p · w; holds for each i and so the price p supports the
allocation (xi, ... , Xm)· 
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In view of the first welfare theorem (Theorem 1.4), we know that a quasiequi­
librium is necessarily a weakly Pareto optimal allocation. This observation tells us 
where our search for quasiequilibria should be confined, i.e., the quasiequilibria are 
among the weakly Pareto optimal allocations. Following this method, A. Mas-Cole!! 
(8] was able to prove the existence of quasiequilibria by introducing the notion of 
closedness for an exchange economy. We shall discuss this condition next. 
For the rest of the discussion in this section, we shall assume that each preference 
relation '.:::i is represented by a utility function ui. A feasible allocation is an m­
tuple (x1, ... , xm) such that Xi E E+ holds for each i and I:;':1 Xi ::; w. A utility
allocation is any vector of the form (u1(x1), . . .  ,um(xm)) where (x1, ... ,xm) is a
feasible allocation. The set of all utility allocations is referred to as the utility space 
of the economy and is denoted by U, i.e. , 
U = {(u1(x1), . . .  ,um(xm)) : (x1, . . . ,xm) is afeasible allocation} .
The utility space enjoys several interesting properties; for details see (4, Section 3.5]. 
An exchange economy is said to satisfy the closedness condition whenever its 
utility space is a closed (or, equivalently, a compact) subset of lRm. 
The following remarkable theorem was proven by A. Mas-Cole!! in [8]. 
Theorem 1.6. (Mas-Colell) If an exchange economy satisfies the closedness condi­
tion, preferences are uniformly proper and the total endowment is extremely desirable 
by each consumer, then the economy has a quasiequilibrium. 
There is one more important companion theorem to the welfare theorems. It is 
the core equivalence theorem of G. Debreu and H. E. Scarf (6]. The theorem (whose 
origins go back to Y. Edgeworth) asserts-under some appropriate hypotheses-that 
an allocation is a Walrasian equilibrium if and only if it belongs to the core of every 
r-fold replica of the economy. 
The definitions of the notions mentioned above are as follows. 
a) An allocation (xi, ... , xm) is said to be a Walrasian equilibrium whenever
there exists a non-zero price p such that each Xi is a maximal element in the
budget set Bi(P) = {x E E+: p · x::; p · xi} .
b) An allocation (x1, ... ,xm ) is said to be a core allocation whenever it cannot
be blocked by any coalition, i.e. , whenever there is no allocation (y1, . . .  , Ym )
and no coalition S such that
1) Li ES Yi = LiES Wi; and
2) y; >-i Xi for each i E S.
c) The r-fold replica of an economy is a new economy with the following charac­
teristics:
a) (E, E') is also the Riesz dual system of the r-fold replica economy;
/3) The economy has mr consumers indexed by (i,j) (i = 1, . . . ,m; (j 
1, . . .  , r) such that each consumer (i,j) has an initial endowment Wij = Wi
and a preference '.'.::: ij = '.'.::: i. The consumers ( i, j) (j = 1, . . .  , r) are the
consumers of "type i" and, of course, they are exact replicas of consumer i.
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Every allocation ( x 1, . • •  , x m ) can be considered as an allocation of every r­
replica economy by letting Xij = x; for each (i,j). Following [2] and [3], we shall
say that an allocation is an Edgeworth equilibrium whenever it belongs to the core 
of every r-fold replica of the economy. The core equivalence theorem of G. Debreu 
and H. E. Scarf [6] is also known as the Third Fundamental Theorem of Welfare 
Economics. It was extended to the infinite dimensional case by C. D. Aliprantis, 
D. J. Brown, and 0. Burkinshaw [2, Theorem 4.18, p. 1133] as follows. 
Theorem 1.7. (The Third Welfare Theorem) If preferences are uniformly proper
and w > 0, then an allocation is a Walrasian equilibrium if and only if it is an 
Edgeworth equilibrium. 
The proofs of Theorems 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 1.7 utilize the lattice structures of 
the commodity and price spaces. How far can we relax the lattice structures of these 
spaces? We shall discuss this question-and provide some answers-in the next two 
sections. 
2. THE SECOND WELFARE THEOREM
The purpose of this section is to discuss the lattice structure of the price space in 
order for the second welfare theorem to be valid. Accordingly, we shall consider the 
commodity-price duality (E, E') when is described by a dual system where E is a 
Riesz space and E' is a vector subspace of the order dual E-. Surprisingly enough, 
when E' does not inherit the lattice structure of E- (i.e., when E' is not a Riesz
subspace of E-), then a weakly Pareto optimal allocation need not be supported by 
prices. The following example of L. E. Jones [6] will clarify the situation. 
Example 2.1. (Jones) Consider the commodity space E = L1[0, 1]. Since E is a
Banach lattice its order dual coincides with its norm dual and so E- = E' = L=[O, 1 ]. 
(Keep in mind that L= [O, 1] is a Riesz space under the pointwise lattice operations.) 
The price space E' is talrnn to be the vector space of all continuously differentiable 
functions on [O, 1], i.e., E' = C1[0, l]. Clearly, E' is a vector subspace of E- but
it is not a Riesz subspace-the pointwise supremum of two differentiable functions 
need not be a differentiable function. Note also that the natural ordering of C1[O,1]
(which is the same as the one induced by the ordering from L= [O, 1]) makes C1 [O, 1]
a partially ordered vector space with a generating cone. (Recall that the cone C of
a partially ordered vector space E is said to be generating whenever for each x E E 
there exist y, z EC sucli that x = y -z.) 
Now consider a two consumer economy with the following characteristics: 
1) The commodity-price duality is represented by the dual system (E, E').
2) Consumer 1 has an initial endowr1 e11t w1 = �X[o,l] and utility function
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3) Consumer 2 has an initial endowment w1 = !X[o,l] and utility function
u2(x) = fo\1- t)x(t) dt.
Both utility functions (as linear functionals) are weakly continuous, quasi con­
cave, and strictly monotone. It can be shown that the price p of L=[O, 1] defined
by 
p(t) = max{t, 1 - t}
is the only-aside from a scalar multiple-price that supports the allocation (x1, x2), 
where 
x1 = X[o,!J and x2 = Xc!,lJ 
The latter implies that the allocation (x1, x2) is Pareto optimal (and hence a wealdy
Pareto optimal allocation); for details see [4, Example 3.4.5, p. 136]. Since p rf: E', it 
follows that the weakly Pareto optimal allocation ( x1, x2) cannot be price supported
with respect to the dual system (E, E'). II 
The preceding example shows that whenever the price space E' is not a Riesz 
subspace of the order dual E-, the second welfare theorem need not be valid. In other 
words, Example 2.1 suggests that the validity or non validity of the second welfare
theorem is associated with the lattice structure of the price space. As a matter of 
fact, a recent result of A. Mas-Colell and S. F. Richard [ 10] asserts that the Riesz 
space structure of the price space E' suffices to guarantee the validity of the second 
welfare theorem. The theorem can be stated as follows. 
Theorem 2.2. (Mas-Colell-Richard) Assume that an exchange economy with a 
finite number of agents satisfies the following properties: 
1) The commodity-price duality (E, E') is defined by a dual system such that E
is a Riesz space and E' is a Riesz subspace of the order dual E-;
2) The order interval [O,w] is weakly compact, i.e., u(E, E')-compact; and
3) Every preference besides being monotone, convex and Mackey continuous, it is
also w -uniformly Mackey proper.
Then every weakly Pareto optimal allocation (x1, . . .  , xm) can be supported by
a non-zero price p E E' of the form p = V'(:1 p;, where the prices Pi E E' can be 
chosen to satisfy Pi · x ::'.':Pi· Xi whenever x "=:;Xi. 
It should be emphasized that in the above theorem the dual system (E, E') is 
not required to be a Riesz dual system. It is merely required that the price space 
E' to be a Riesz subspace of the order dual E'. Recently, in a remarkable paper,
S. F. Richard [ 11] generalized Theorem 2.2 to production economies-where he also 
assumed that the linear topology r is only locally convex and E' is the topological 
dual of (E,r). 
Let us illustrate Theorem 2.2 (and Theorem 1.6) with a simple example. 
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Example 2.3. Consider a two consumer pure exchange economy with commodity 
space �2 and the following characteristics.
Consumer 1: Initial endowment w1 = (�, �) and utility function
u1 (x, y) = 2x + y = (2, 1) · (x, y) . 
Consumer 2: Initial endowment w2 = G, �) and utility function
u2 ( x, y) = x + 2y = ( 1, 2) · ( x, y) . 
Therefore, the total endowment of the economy is 
W = W1 +w2 = (1, 1) . 
An easy computation shows that the utility space for this exchange economy is the 
darkened region of the plane shown in Figure 1. 
2 3 
Fig. 1 
Thus, the economy satisfies all the hypotheses of Theorem 1.6 and so it must 
have a quasiequilibrium. The quasiequilibrium corresponds to a utility allocation 
on the "utility boundary." It turns out that the utility allocation that gives rise to 
a quasiequilibrium is (2, 2). The quasiequilibrium is ( (1, 0), (0, 1)) and the price
supporting this quasiequilibrium is p = (1, 1). 
The price (1, 1) is a scalar multiple of the suprernum of the prices (2, 1) and
(1, 2); we have, of course,
(2, 1) v (1, 2) = (2 v 1, 1 v 2) = (2, 2) = 2(1, 1). 1111 
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3. THE THIRD WELFARE THEOREM
In this section, we shall establish that the validity of the core equivalence the­
orem guarantees that the price space is necessarily a Riesz space. This is the main 
contribution of this paper to the literature. It simply completes the cycle of ideas 
according to which the existence of "optimum" allocations is intimately related to 
the lattice structure of the price space. We are now ready to present the main result 
of this paper. Keep in mind that by r we designate a locally convex topology on E 
which is consistent with the dual pair (E, E'). 
Theorem 3.1. Consider a dual system (E,E'), where E is a Riesz space and E'
is a vector subspace of the order dual E' such that 
1) the order intervals of E are weakly compact2; and
2) the cone E'nE+ is generating, i.e., every linear functional of E' can be written
as a difference of two positive linear functionals of E'.
Furthermore, assume that whenever (xi, X2) is an Edgeworth equilibrium of an arbi­
trary two consumer exchange economy whose commodity-price duality is described by 
the dual system (E, E') and each preference :::::; is ( v;, V;)-uniformly r-proper there 
exists a non-zero price p EE' that supports (xi,x2) as a quasiequilibrium satisfying 
p ·  v = 1 and 
where v =vi+ v2 and V =Vin V2.
iP · zi :::; 1 for all z E V,
Then, the price space E' is a Riesz subspace of the order dual E-.
In order to establish this result, we need a lemma which is of some independent 
interest in its own right. 
Lemma 3.2. Consider a two consumer exchange economy with dual system (E, E'),
where E is a Riesz space and E' is a vector subspace of the order dual E-. Assume 
that the preferences are represented by two utility functions of the form 
ui(x) = f(x) and u2(x)=g(x), 
where f and g are two positive linear functionals on E. 
2 If the positive cone E+ is in addition weakly closed, then this condition guarantees that 
E is a Dedekind complete Riesz space. To see this, let 0 :::; x,, f:::; y hold in E. Since the 
order interval [O,yJ is weakly compact and {xa} is a net of [O,y],it follows that {xa} has a 
convergent subnet to some vector X E [O, y ]. Relabelling1 we can assume that Xa � X and we 
claim that x = sup{x,,} holds. From x,, 2': Xfi (i.e., x,, - Xfi E E+) for all a 2': fJ and 
the fact that E+ is weakly closed, we see that X - x13 = lim,,(x,, - Xa) EE+, i.e., X 2': XR 
holds for each fJ. On the other hand, if z 2': x,, (i.e., z - x,, E E+)· holds for all a, th;n
z - X = lima (z - Xa) EE+, and so z 2::_ X. Therefore, the vector x is the least upper bound 
of the net {x,,}. 
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If the supremum in the formula 
fV 9(w) = sup{f(y) +9(z): y, z EE+ and y +z = w} 
is attained at (x1,x2) [i.e., x 1, x 2  EE+, X1 +x2 = w, and fV9(w) = f(x1) +9(x2)], 
then 
a) f V 9(x1) = f(x1) and JV 9(x2) = 9(x2); and
b) the price fV 9 (which need not lie in E') supports the allocation (xi,x2), i.e,
x :::; x ;  implies f V 9(x) 2 f V 9(x ;) .
Proof. Assume that x 1, X2 E E+ satisfy X1 +x2 = w and f V 9( w) = f(x1) + 9( x2). 
To see that f V 9( x 1) = f( x1) holds, assume by way of contradiction that f V 9( x 1) > 
f(x1). Then there exist z1, z2 EE+ with z1 + z2 = x 1  and f(z1) + 9(z2) > f(x1). 
This implies 
f V 9(w) 2 f(z1) + 9(z2 + x2) 
= f(z1) + 9(z2) + 9(x2) 
> f(x1) + 9(x2) 
= f V 9(w) , 
which is impossible. Thus, /V 9(xi) = f(x1) and (similarly) /V 9(x2) = 9(x2) both 
hold. 
To see that the price f V 9 supports the allocation ( x 1, x 2) ,  let x :::1 x 1. This
means that f(x) 2 f(x1), and so 
f V 9(x) 2 f(x ) 2 f(x1) = f V 9(xi) . 
Similarly, x :::z Xz implies f V 9(x) 2 f V 9(xz). II 
Now to complete the proof of Theorem 3.1, assume that the dual system (E, E') 
satisfies the properties of the theorem and let f, 9 E E'. It suffices to show that
f V 9 (the least upper bound of f and 9 taken in E-) belongs to E'. Pick positive 
linear functionals /1, fz, 91, 92 E E' such that f = Ji -fz and 9 = 91 - 92 and
let h = fz + 92 E E'. Then we have h 2 -f and h 2 -9 (i.e., h + f 2 0 and
h + 9 2 0). From the lattice identity h + f V 9 = (h + !) V (h + 9), we see that it
suffices to show that (h + f) V (h + 9) belongs to E'. Therefore, replacing f and
9 by h + f and h + 9 respectively, we can assume from the outset that f > 0 and 
9 > 0 both hold. In addition, note that if either f V 9 = f or f V 9 = 9 holds, then 
there is nothing to prove. Thus, we can also assume that f V 9 > f and f V 9 > 9 
both hold. 
Consider now an exchange economy having dual system (E, E') and two con­
sumers with utility functions given by the formulas 
u1(x) = f(x) and u2(x) = 9(x ) . 
Clearly, both utility functions (as linear) are uniformly r-proper. Fix two proper
;.rectors v1 > 0 and v2 > 0 for u1 and ·u2, respectively, corresponding to a T­
neighborhood V of zero and then fix some w > 0 such that 
O<v = v1 +v2:Sw, fV9(w)-f(w)>O, and fV9(w)-9(w)>O.  (*) 
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Since the order interval [O, w] is weakly compact, it is easy to see that the 
supremum 
fVg(w) = sup{f(y) + g(z): y,zEE+ and y +z = w} 
is attained. That is, there exist x 1, x2  E [O,w] with X1 +x2 = w and f(x 1)+g(x 2) = 
f V g(w). By Lemma 3.2, we have 
Next note that f(x 1 )  > 0 and g(x 2) > 0 both hold. Indeed, if f(x1) = 0 holds, 
then 
f V g(w) = f(x1) + g(x2) = g(x 2) :S g(w) :Sf V g(w) , 
and so f V g(w) - g(w) = 0, contrary to (*) · Hence, f(x1) > 0 (and similarly) 
g(x2) > 0. Without loss of generality, we can also assume that 
Next, pick some 8;::: 1 such that of( xi) = f(8x1) = g(x 2), and then let 
and 
Clearly, 
and 
Now put w* = YI + Y2 ;::: w, and then give the two consumers the initial endow­
ments 
W1 = W2 = HY1 +Y2) . 
Clearly, f V g(w1) = f V g(w2) = f(YI) = g(y2) . Observe that the inequalities 
guarantee that Aw = Aw*, i.e. ,  the ideals generated by w and w* coincide. 
We claim that the allocation (YI, Y2) is an Edgeworth equilibrium. To see this, 
note that the price q = f V g E E" satisfies the following property: 
z >-I YI implies 
Indeed, z >-I YI means f(z) > f(YI) and so 
q·z = f V g(z);::: f(z) > f(YI) = fVg(wI) = q·wI . 
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Similarly, z �2 y2 implies q · z > q · W1. Since (y1, y2) is supported by the price q 
(which is possibly outside of E') as a Walrasian equilibrium, it follows that (y1,y2) 
is an Edgeworth equilibrium. 
By our hypothesis, there exists some non-zero price Pw E E' that supports
(Y1, Y2) as a quasiequilibrium such that
Pw · v = 1 and IPw  · zJ � 1 for all z E V .
Clearly, Pw 2 0. From Pw'Yl = Pw·W1 and Pw'Y2 = Pw·w2, we see that Pw'Yl = Pw'Y2· 
In addition, from 
1 = Pw . v � Pw . w* = Pw . W1 + Pw . W2 ,
we see that Pw · Y1 = Pw · Y2 = Pw · W1 = Pw · Wz 2 �. 
Now fix 0 < y E E. Then, we claim that
> Pw ·y1 j( ) P w  · Y 
_ f(yi) Y and 
p . y > Pw·Y2 g(y)w - g(y,) 
hold. Since both inequalities can be established by similar arguments, we shall 
establish the validity of the first inequality. We distinguish two cases. 
a) Assume that P w  · y = 0.
This implies that >.y E B1(Pw) = {x E E+: Pw · x � Pw · yi} for each A > 0,
and so y1 �1 >.y holds for each >. > 0. Therefore,
f(Y1) 2 f(>.y)'= >.j(y) 2 0 
holds for each >. > 0, and thus f(y) = 0. So, the inequality Pw · y 2 j(��) f(y) is
trivially true. 
b) Assume that P w  · y > 0.
In this case, we claim that y1 �1 7w'.� y holds. Otherwise, 7w
·y; y �1 y1 and
Pw·yy, y E B1(Pw) contradict the maximality of Y1 E B1(Pw)· Now from Y1 �1 P;}; y,
it follows that f(y1) 2 �ww'.Y; f(y), or Pw · Y 2 j'(��)J(y). 
If 1 t Ao - � - Pw'Y2 th > f h ld s· 'l 1 > c we e � f(Yi) f(y,), 'en Pw _ a o s. 1rm ar y, Pw _ ag. onse-
quently, 
P w  2 af V ag = a(f V g). 
In particular, we have 
Pw · w* = (af V ag)(w*) = (af V ag)(Y1) + (af V ag)(y2) 
2 af(Y1) + ag(Y2) 
= P w  · Y1 + Pw · Y2 = Pw · w* , 
and so Pw · w* = (af V ag)(w*) holds. Now if 0 � y � w* holds, then from
P w  · y 2 (af V ag)(y), P w  · (w* - y) 2 (af V ag)(w* - y), and
Pw · w* = Pw · Y + Pw 
· 
(w* - y) = (af V ag)(w*) 
= (af V ag)(y) + (af V ag)(w* - y), 
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we see that 
P w  · Y = (af V ag)(y) = a(f V g)(y)
holds for each y E Aw• = Aw. Since 1 = Pw · v = a(f V g )( v) holds, it follows that
a= (fv!)(v) > 0. Therefore,
P w·y=a(fVg)(y) 
holds for each y E Aw. 
Now consider the directed set 
n={w>O: w>v, fVg(w)>f(w), and fVg(w)>g(w)}, 
and note that {pw: w En} is a net lying in the polar set V0 of V. By the classical
theorem of L. Alaoglu, the net {pw: w E n} has a weak* limit point in E'. By
passing to a subnet, we ca,ri assume that Pw � p holds in E'. From Pw · v = 1, we
see that p · v = 1 and so p =F 0. In addition, from (**) , it is easy to see that
p·y=a(fVg)(y) 
holds for all y E E. Thus, f V g = l p E E' holds, and the proof of the theorem isa 
finished. 
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